A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United States by Delbruck, Jost
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 67 | Issue 4 Article 2
Fall 1992
A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under
the Authority of the United States
Jost Delbruck
Christian-Albrechts-Universitit Kiel
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the International Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Delbruck, Jost (1992) "A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United States," Indiana Law Journal:
Vol. 67: Iss. 4, Article 2.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol67/iss4/2
A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention
Under the Authority of the United Nations
JOST DELBRt.CK*
INTRODUCTION
The international system has undergone dramatic changes in recent years.
Politically, the Cold War has come to an end and has given way to growing
cooperation between the former ideological camps in the East and the West.
Structurally, the bipolar distribution of power that dominated the interna-
tional system for well over thirty years has vanished as a result of the
decline of the status of the former Soviet Union as a rival superpower of
the United States. The cooperation between the United States and the Soviet
Union during the Gulf War crisis most poignantly highlights the extent to
which the international scene has changed. This cooperation enabled the
United Nations (UN) to function for the first time in full accord with the
provisions of the UN Charter in a case of blatant aggression by one member
state, Iraq, against another, Kuwait. The Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, could promptly react to the
Iraqi aggression: it consecutively condemned the invasion of Kuwait as an
"act of aggression" according to Article 39 of the Charter;' decided on
severe economic sanctions and their enforcement, 2 by military means if
necessary; 3 and ultimately authorized the member states cooperating with
Kuwait to use all means necessary to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation
and to restore peace and security "in the area." '4
* Professor of German Constitutional Law, International Law, and European Community
Law, Christian-Albrechts-Universitit Kid, Germany; Visiting Professor of International Law
and European Community Law, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. Dr.iur.habil.,
Kiel, 1971; LL.M, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington, 1960.
1. S.C. Res. 660, 45 U.N. SCOR (2932d mtg.) at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990)
(resolution of Aug. 2, 1990).
2. S.C. Res. 661, 45 U.N. SCOR (2933d mtg.) at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990)
(resolution of Aug. 6, 1990).
3. S.C. Res. 665, 45 U.N. SCOR (2938th mtg.) at 21, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990)
(resolution of Aug. 25, 1990).
4. S.C. Res. 678, 45 U.N. SCOR (2963d mtg.) at 27, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990)
(resolution of Nov. 29, 1990) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 678]. This mandate to the military coalition
against Iraq lends support to the view that the military enforcement measures against Iraq
were taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Articles 39, 40-42, and 48), rather than
under Article 51. While a mandate restricted to the liberation of Kuwait could have come
under Article 51 as a measure of "collective self-defence," U.N. CamARTE art. 51, the actual
mandate authorizing the "restoration of peace and security in the area," S.C. Res. 678, supra
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The later measures authorized by the Security Council for the rescue of
the oppressed minorities inside Iraq are of even greater interest in the
present context. The newly established basic consensus among the Soviet
Union, the United States, and the other great western powers allowed for
measures to be taken inside a sovereign member state, to protect minority
groups from massive human rights violations that, at times, amounted to
acts equivalent to genocide.5 In other words, the international community
witnessed a case of intervention by the United Nations within the borders
of a member state, in pursuit of protecting the most fundamental human
rights being violated by that member state's own government.
These events have pushed the United Nations into the public limelight to
an almost unprecedented degree. They have also raised the difficult question
of whether the UN Charter can generally justify such interventions or
whether this particular instance of intervention by the United Nations must
be seen as a follow-up measure unique to the police action against Iraq,
which, outside of the Gulf crisis context, would constitute a violation of
the principle of nonintervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the Charter. 6
In other words, the question raised is whether the Security Council's
competence to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter is confined to
(emphasis added), definitely was broader in scope than what a "collective self-defence"
operation could legally achieve. The same view is taken by Partsch, Von der Souverdnitlit zur
Solidaritdt: Wandelt sich das V6lkerrecht? [From Sovereignty to Solidarity: Is International
Law Changing?], 18 Euiop'iscan GRuNDRECHE. ZErrsc:HRIT 469, 471 (1991); see also Heinz,
Philipp & Wolfrum, Zweiter Golfkrieg: Anwendungsfall von Kapitel VII der U.N.-Charta [The
Second Gulf War: A Case of Applying Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter], 39 V-iNrrE
NATIONEN 121, 126 (1991).
5. See S.C. Res. 688, reprinted in 30 INTERNATIoNAL LEoAL MATERI Ms 858 (1991)
(resolution of Apr. 5, 1991) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 688] [Subsequent page references are to 30
INTERNATIONAL LEoAL MATEmLss.].
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. The heightened attention the UN has received during,
and due to, the Gulf crisis is reflected in the large number of immediate literary comments
and analyses by political scientists and international law experts. Without attempting to give
an exhaustive survey of the relevant literature, attention may be drawn to Bothe, Die Golfkrise
und die Vereinten Nationen IThe Gulf crisis and the United Nations], 19 DEMOKRATIE UN
REcHT 2 (1991); Fleischhauer, Wirtschaftliche Zwangsmaflnahmen in Recht und Praxis der
Weltorganisation-Die Anwendung von Sanktionen durch die Vereinten Nationen in der
Golfkrise [Economic Enforcement Actions in the Law and Practice of the World Organization-
The Application of Sanctions by the United Nations in the Gulf Crisis], 39 VERENmTE NATIONEN
41 (1991); Franck & Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth, "
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); Freedman, The Gulf War and the New World Order, 33
SuRvvAL 195 (1991); Heinz, Philipp & Wolfrum, supra note 4; Hottinger, Die Golf-Krise am
Rande des Krieges The Gulf Crisis on the Verge of War], 507 (1990); Hottinger, Der Auftakt
zur Golf-Krise IThe Opening Phase of the Gulf Crisis], 45 EUROPA-ARCHIV 46 EUROPA-ARcHIv
1 (1991); Partsch, supra note 4; Riihl, Pattsituation in der Golf-Krise [Stalemate in the Gulf
Crisis], 22 EURoPA-ARcmlv 663 (1990); Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1991); Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf
Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 522 (1991); Weiss & Campbell,
Military Humanitarianism, 33 SuRvrvAL 451 (1991); Hendrikson, Defining a New World Order
12 (discussion paper prepared for "Roundtable on Defining a New World Order," The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, May 2 and 3, 1991).
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cases of military aggression or military threats to international peace and
security. If that were the case, enforcement actions to rescue oppressed
people within the territory of a member state from grave violations of their
most basic human rights committed at the hands of their own government
could not be brought within the scope of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Such intervention actions would have to be considered illegal.
In order to answer this question, one has to go back to the text, the
intent, and the drafting history of the relevant articles of the UN Charter,
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to the development of the actual
practice of the main political organs of the UN, the Security Council, and
the General Assembly in the interpretation and application of such articles.
Furthermore, a look at general international law with regard to the principle
of nonintervention and its rationale may shed some light on the problem.
The following argument, therefore, will be developed in three steps. Part I
provides a short summary of the content and rationale of the principle of
nonintervention under general international law and an exposition of the
Charter law under Article 2(7) and Chapter VII. Part II presents a survey
of UN practice with regard to the relevant Charter provisions in cases of
grave human rights violations. Finally, in Part III an attempt is made to
answer the question of whether the Charter actually does provide for the
Security Council's authority to intervene in the internal affairs of a member
state in cases of grave human rights violations and to use military force if
necessary.
I. T)E PRn ciPLE oF NONINTERVENTION
UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNDER THE UN CHARTER
iN CASES OF GRAvE HUmAN RiGHTs VIOLATIONS
A. The Principle of Nonintervention
Under General International Law
The principle of nonintervention is deeply enshrined in general interna-
tional law. It has its legal basis and legal policy foundations in the principles
of the sovereignty and equality of states, the constitutive elements of the
international legal order.7 Recognition of sovereignty-the independence and
freedom of states from any external dominance in the determination of
their domestic and foreign policies and the equality of states under law-
excludes, in principle, the permissibility of interventions by third parties.
The scope, however, of the prohibition against intervention in the internal
or domestic affairs of states is still controversial. On the one hand, there
7. See Ermacora, Commentary on Article 2(7) no. 10 and 12, in Dm CHARTA DER
VaanEnirE= NATiONEN-KOENTAR 103-04 (B. Simma ed. 1991) (calling the principle a "con-
stitutional principle of the World Community").
1992]
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are those who support a broad construction of the concept of noninterven-
tion that is based on a corresponding expansive interpretation of the concept
of sovereignty. If sovereignty not only is to denote the legal independence
and self-determination of states, but also is supposed to have a substantive
meaning in the real world of international relations, it is argued, it must
be protected from violations as a matter of law. Hence, a principle of
nonintervention commensurate in scope to that of the principle of sover-
eignty must be recognized under international law.' Others, on the other
hand, advocate a restrictive interpretation of the principle of noninterven-
tion. They argue that a broadly construed concept of sovereignty and a
corresponding broad interpretation of the principle of nonintervention no
longer meets the demands of the growing internationalization of states'
responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security as
well as for the protection of human rights. 9 If such growing international
responsibilities are recognized as a matter of law, sovereignty must be
viewed as legally more limited than in the past. This, in turn, must result
in a restrictive interpretation of the scope of the principle of nonintervention,
leaving room for international interventions in the domestic affairs of
states-if not generally, then at least under certain well-defined circum-
stances.
Qualifying the permissibility of international interventions in this way,
however, indicates that within this second school of thought as well there
is, as of now, no consensus as to the criteria or the circumstances allowing
for interventions. Nor is there general agreement as to what kind of actions
taken in the course of interventions could be considered legal; that is,
whether such interventions could be carried out by the use of (military)
force or whether they must be restricted to measures short of the use of
force. According to widespread opinion, the general prohibition against the
use of force under international law does not allow for unilateral forcible
interventions by individual states even for the purpose of rescuing citizens
of third states, or their own, from threats to their lives and physical safety.
That is to say, so-called humanitarian interventions, once accepted as legal,
are widely viewed as illegal today.'0 Countermeasures even against grave
and massive human rights violations are, for good reason, considered to be
8. See Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 397,
408 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1987). Thomas Oppermann pertinently states that "the raison d'tre of
the nonintervention rule is the protection of the sovereignty of the State." Opperman,
Intervention, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 233, 235.
9. See G. DAHm, J. DELBRfICK & R. WOLFRUM, I/1 V6UEmtacir 11 (2d ed. 1989).
10. For a comprehensive review of the present range of opinions with regard to humanitarian
interventions on behalf of citizens of third states and of a state's own citizens on the territory
of another state, see Beyerlin, Humanitarian Intervention, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUnuC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 211; Fisher, Kapitel: Friedenssicherung und friedliche
Streitbeilegung, in V6LKERRIcuTrr 900 (K. Ipsen 3d ed. 1991).
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restricted to economic and diplomatic sanctions below the threshold of the
use of force: Allowing military enforcement measures based on the "iso-
lated" decisions of individual states would lead to an erosion of the general
prohibition against the use of force and against "dictatorial interfer-
ence[s]." 1 ' Since the assessment of the factual situation, the determination
of the appropriate means to be applied, and the execution of the intervention
would all be administered by the intervening state, the door to purely
arbitrary intervention, that is, acts of aggression in disguise, would be wide
open.
In a world community heeding diverse values and pursuing different,
often antagonistic, interests, it is easy to conceive of states invoking all
kinds of justae causae as a justification for intervention. This objection to
a more liberal regime governing the law of intervention need not necessarily
hold true if interventions in the internal affairs of a state that commits
grave human rights violations are decided on the basis of an orderly and
lawful procedure and are executed by an international organization such as
the UN as the representative of the international community of states. The
question is, therefore, what the authority of the UN is in this regard.
B. The Principle of Nonintervention Under Article 2(7)
and the Authority of the UN Security Council
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
The United Nations possesses broader authority to act in cases of threats
to and breaches of international peace and security than did the League of
Nations. Under Chapter VI, the UN Charter provides conciliatory and
investigatory powers to the General Assembly 2 and the Security Council.
Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to take binding enforcement
measures "to maintain or restore international peace and security"' 3 after
it has decided under Article 39 that an act of aggression or a threat to or
a breach of international peace and security has occurred. 14 However, in
taking action, the main political organs of the United Nations under the
11. The term "dictatorial interference"-a very telling description of what constitutes an
illegal intervention-is used by L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (Lauterpacht 8th
ed. 1955); see also A. VERDRoss & B. SWMA, UNIVERSELLES V6LKERRECHT-THEORIE UND
PRAxIs § 490, at 300 (3d ed. 1984).
12. The General Assembly may also recommend enforcement measures under The Uniting
for Peace Resolution. G.A. Res. 377(v), 5 U.N. GAOR (302d plen. mtg.) Supp. (No. 20) at
20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). For discussion of the historical and legal aspects of this
resolution, see Nolte, Uniting for Peace, in HANDBUCH VEi~mTE NATIONEN 950 (R. Wolfrum
2d rev.. ed. 1991); Randelzhofer, Article 2(4) no. 42, in Dm CHARTA DER VEarINmTN NATiONEN-
KoM1.mNAR, supra note 7, at 81; Stein & Morrissey, Uniting for Peace Resolution, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 379.
13. U.N. CHRTmR art. 39.
14. Id.
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Charter are subject to the principle of nonintervention just as states acting
outside the United Nations are bound by this principle according to the
principles of international law. Article 2(7) of the Charter provides that
"[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters
to settlement under the present Charter."' 5 This basic principle, which
normally governs the relationship between the organs of the United Nations
and the member states, provides, however, for an important exception.
Article 2(7) continues by stating that "this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."'' 6 Invoking this
exception presupposes that the Security Council has made the decision to
intervene according to Article 39. This decision under Article 39, in turn,
implies that the Security Council has come to the conclusion that the matter
on which it desires to act does not constitute a matter "essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction"'" of the state concerned.
In cases of acts of aggression and threats to international peace and
security, it is perfectly clear that these per definitionem cannot be matters
essentially falling within the domestic jurisdiction of the state or states
concerned. And yet, in cases of even grave violations of fundamental human
rights, it may be doubtful whether they constitute "matters ... essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction" Is of the state, or states, concerned. Human
rights are to govern the relationship between governments and citizens.
Therefore, it may well be argued that human rights violations are only of
domestic concern. Furthermore, experience shows that even grave violations
of the most fundamental human rights, at first glance, do not always entail
direct (transborder) threats to international peace.
If one accepts this view, the Security Council is barred from intervening
even in cases of grave violations of fundamental human rights since under
Article 2(7) these would have to be considered matters essentially within the
domestic jhrisdiction of the state concerned. By the same token, they would
not per se constitute a threat to international peace, thus excluding the
applicability of the exception provided for in Article 2(7) in favor of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, that is, measures
taken against acts of aggression or against threats to international peace.
This interpretation of Article 2(7), which would restrict the right of the
Security Council (or the General Assembly, for that matter) to intervene
into the internal affairs of a member state to cases of outright acts of
aggression, threats to, or breaches of international peace, would clearly be
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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in line with the opinion prevailing at the San Francisco Conference of
1945.19 Most governments participating in the founding of the United
Nations favored an extensive interpretation of the principle of noninterven-
tion as a restriction on the powers vested, for instance, in the Security
Council. 2 This interpretation is, however, neither the only possible one nor
is it the one that the main political organs of the United Nations followed
in dealing with human rights questions.
From the very beginning, the main political organs of the United Nations
have concerned themselves with cases of grave human rights violations.2'
The most important cases were the fight against the South African govern-
ment's apartheid policies and other instances of human rights violations by
racist or terrorist regimes. In all of these cases the offending states raised
the objection that the General Assembly or the Security Council were in
violation of the principle of nonintervention contained in Article 2(7) of
the Charter." The two organs have consistently held, however, that Article
2(7) could not be invoked by the states concerned because as member states
of the United Nations they were bound by the Charter provisions protecting
human rights, such as Article 1(3)1 and Article 55.24 Thus, the human rights
violations dealt with by the political organs of the UN no longer constituted
"matters ... essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"' 2 of the states
concerned.? In view of this consistent UN practice, present international
law can be safely interpreted as considering human rights violations within
the border of member states not as "matters ... essentially within [their]
domestic jurisdiction."2 7 Public discussion of such human rights violations
in the political organs of the United Nations, therefore, would no longer
violate the principle of nonintervention. This would hold true regardless of
the severity of the human rights violations the UN organs are addressing.
19. For a summary review of the opinions voiced at the San Francisco Conference, see
Ermacora, supra note 7, at 102-03.
20. See generally id.
21. Ermacora, supra note 7, at 104-06, provides a list of the most important cases that
the Security Council and/or the General Assembly of the United Nations have dealt with.
22. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
26. For a representative treatment of this subject, see Ermacora, supra note 7, at 106-10,
who points out, however, that one rarely finds a detailed consideration by the organs involved
of the relevant international legal argument. This is due to the fact that the United Nations
perceives itself as a primarily political organization. Therefore, in practice political and
humanitarian reasons for the respective decisions predominate over strictly legal reasons. With
regard to this self-perception of the United Nations, see Delbrfick, Peacekeeping by the United
Nations and the Rule of Law, in DEC.ARATIONS ON PRJNcnLEs-A QUEsr FOR UNsansAL
PEACE 73 (1977). On the reduced role of the principle of nonintervention in cases of a
"consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations [of human tights]," see A. VERDROSS
& B. SIMMA, supra note 11, at § 494, at 303.
27. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
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Thus, neither the broad interpretation of the principle of nonintervention
as voiced during the San Francisco Conference2 nor the corresponding
restrictive view of the rights of intervention power vested in the political
organs of the UN29 provide for a principled barrier to UN intervention,
particularly in cases of grave violations of fundamental human rights
protected under international and/or UN legal instruments.
Yet one has to recognize that the UN has adopted sanctions against grave
human rights violations only in rare cases. In fact, such enforcement
measures have been taken only in very severe cases such as in connection
with the policies of apartheid and other forms of racist activities. Further-
more, it has to be emphasized that sanctions adopted in these cases were
kept below the level of (military) enforcement measures and that sanctions
were decided upon with binding effect under Chapter VII of the Charter
in only two casesA0 The UN practice referred to here, therefore, did not
take all forms of human rights violations anywhere in the world as a starting
point for its decisions on sanctions. Rather, the cases on point all related
to the specific situation in Southern Africa. In particular, the policies of
apartheid and equivalents thereof, and only these, were gradually charac-
terized as "disturbance[s] of international peace" and finally as "threat[s]
to international peace" and security.31 The United Nations was not ready,
however, to conclude generally that all grave human rights violations qualify
as threats to the peace under Chapter VII or as a separate basis for UN
action apart from the circumstances named in Article 39 of the Charter,
namely "act[s] of aggression" and "threat[s] to the peace [and] breach[es]
of the peace. ' 3 2
28. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
29. Id.
30. These cases were Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), S.C. Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR
(1428th mtg.) at 5 (1968) (extending the previous oil embargo of S.C. Res. 221, 21 U.N.
SCOR (1277th mtg.) at 5 (1966), and calling for extensive additional economic sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)); and South Africa, S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR(2046th mtg.) at 5 (1977) (calling for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa). For
a comprehensive survey of the handling of the Zimbabwe case by the Security Council, see
Stoll, Konflikte, Rhodesien/Zimbabwe, in HANDBUCH VEREINTE NATiONEN, supra note 12, at
501, 503-04, and of the South Africa case, see Stoll, Konflikte, Sfidafrika, in HmANBUC
VERnmrNa NATiONEN, supra note 12, at 505, 511.
31. See Delbrfick, supra note 26, at 87 (citations omitted).
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. The objections raised by this author against a general qualifi-
cation of unjust situations or actions violating human rights as "threat[s] to the peace" in the
sense of Chapter VII of the Charter are not abandoned here. However, the concern here is
that the use of military force against the life and liberty of people, as occurred in the Iraqi
government's persecution of the Kurdish minority, or genocide-like, systematic human rights
violations, should, if necessary, be condemned as threats to international peace and security.
This would enable the United Nations to take enforcement measures under Chapter VII of
the Charter in order to prevent or stop such criminal activities. For a statement of the former,
now modified, position, see Delbriick, Rechtsprobleme der Friedenssicherung durch Sicher-
heitsrat und Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen [Legal Problems Relating to the
[Vol. 67:887
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The Security Council's adoption of Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991 may
indicate a change in the former practice of the Council.3 3 In this resolution,
the Security Council in strong language requested Iraq to end the repression
of the Kurds and other minorities in Iraq and to grant international
humanitarian organizations that were offering aid for the oppressed people
access to its territory.34 Furthermore, Resolution 688 asked the UN Secretary
General to support the refugees with all necessary means available. 3
In Resolution 688, the Security Council, without expressly referring to
Article 39 or Chapter VII as a whole, characterized the persecution of the
Kurdish people by the Iraqi government as "threatening international peace
and security."' 36 Article 39 evidently was seen by the Council as the legal
basis of its decision, 37 a decision that in view of this legal basis must be
considered binding upon Iraq in all parts. The Iraqi government has
challenged this view, pointing out that the resolution's mandate conferred
on the UN Secretary General a certain degree of political discretion as to
how he would implement his task.3 Furthermore, the Iraqi government
emphasized that the UN Secretary General had based the mandated relief
actions for the Kurds on a Memorandum of Understanding39 with the Iraqi
government that expressly recognized "respect for the territorial integrity,
the political independence and the principle of nonintervention." 40 Thus,
according to the Iraqi position, the presence of the UN-sponsored relief
units and their camps on Iraqi territory legally rested on the Iraqi govern-
ment's sovereign consent, not on any binding decision of the UN Security
Council.4' This view, however, reflects neither the legal nature of Resolution
688 nor the intentions of the Security Council. The clear assessment of the
Maintenance of Peace through the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United
Nations], in Dm VERBIrEN NATIONEN IM WANDEL [CHANGING UNITED NATIONS] 131 (W.
Kewenig ed. 1975; Public. Series Inst. Int'l Law at Univ. of Kiel, Berlin, vol. 73).
33. See S.C. Res. 688, supra note 5.
34. Id. at 859.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. (resolution preamble, para. 3; operative portion of resolution, no. 1). Doubts
as to whether the Security Council did, indeed, base its decision on Article 39 and Chapter
VII in general are voiced by Partsch, supra note 4, at 475.
38. See respective statements in Memorandum of Understanding, reprinted in 30 INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 860, 1991, and summary of the Iraqi position by Heinz, Philipp
& Wolfrum, supra note 4, at 125.
39. Memorandum of Understanding, reprinted in 30 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 860(1991). The consensual method chosen by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to implement
his mandate was not only politically expeditious, but was also in line with his personal view
expressed earlier in an address he gave at Bordeaux on "International Law and Morality"
(excerpts published in U.N. WE=Y OF MAY 2, 1991, AT 2), in which he had characterized
the Kurdish problem as an internal matter of Iraq. The Secretary General in this address
advocated a reconsideration of this position pro futuro, however. Id.
40. See Heinz, Philipp & Wolfrum, supra note 4, at 125.
41. For a summary of the Iraqi position, see id.
1992]
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Iraqi oppression of the Kurds and other minorities within Iraq as a threat
to international peace and security, as well as the total absence of any hint
by the Council that this resolution was meant to be only a recommendation,
clearly contradicts the Iraqi point of view. In addition, the Security Council
clearly acquiesced in the temporary presence of American, British, and
French military forces in Northern Iraq to provide support and protection
for the Kurds against genocidal attacks by Iraqi government forces. The
Council could not have tolerated these activities under Resolution 688 if
aid and protection for the Kurds on Iraqi territory had been meant to be
dependent on Iraqi consent.
However, the dispute over whether the relief action for the Kurds ordered
by the Security Council did or did not need Iraqi consent demonstrates the
persisting insecurities with respect to the assessment of UN interventions
directed at preventing or ending grave human rights violations. In view of
the increasing number of violent acts of oppression against minorities in
various countries, particularly those involving the use of armed force against
civilians, there is a clear need to develop more satisfactory answers with
regard to the question whether the United Nations Charter allows for an
interpretation that would enable the Security Council to deal more effectively
with grave human rights violations.
II. Is THmRE MORE EFFEcTIvE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF FUNDAMENTAL HUmAN RIGHTs
UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND T=E UN CEARTER?
A. General International Law
Under general international law, ways of dealing more effectively with
grave violations of fundamental human rights that would go beyond the
present law as outlined previously, 42 are difficult to conceive. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice, in the Barcelona Traction Case,43 has certainly
recognized the concept of an erga omnes-effect of fundamental human
rights norms (for example, prohibiting genocide, racism or apartheid, or
torture), a notion that had been put forward in earlier legal writings. 44
Furthermore, modern international law increasingly recognizes the right of
42. See supra Part I.
43. Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Judgment of Feb. 5).
44. For a concise study of the meaning and scope of the so-called erga omnes norms,
including a critical discussion of the respective statements by the International Court of Justice
in Barcelona Traction, see Frowein, Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes im V61kerrecht und ihre
Durchsetzung [Obligations erga omnes in International Law and Their Enforcement), V6ou-
ERRECHT ALS RECHTSORDNUNG-INTERNATIONALE GERICHTSBARKEIT-MENSCHENRECHTE 241
(Festschrift Mosler), (Bernhardt & Geck eds. 1983) (Beitrige zum auslIndischen ffentlichen
Recht und V61kerrecht, vol. 81).
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individual states to enforce fundamental or constitutional norms of the
international community in the general interest of all states. 45 In regard to
the necessity of maintaining the comprehensive validity of the general
prohibition against the use of force, one has to recognize, however, that
such enforcement measures have to stay below the threshold of the use of
military force. Thus, as of now, general international law does not offer
any legal basis for more effective, that is, possibly military, enforcement
mechanisms in cases of grave violations of human rights. If anywhere, such
means could only be found within the institutional structure of the United
Nations or of regional institutions acting within the United Nations frame-
work and Charter law.
B. The Charter of the United Nations
In finding means within the legal and institutional framework of the
United Nations to protect more effectively international human rights against
flagrant violations of fundamental human rights norms, one has to begin
with the interpretation of Chapter VII of the Charter, on the one hand,
and Article 2(7), on the other hand. First, a literal and systematic interpre-
tation of the relevant provisions shows that the scope of the powers of the
Security Council under Chapter VII must extend beyond the power to fend
off or prevent acts of aggression or military breaches of or threats to
international peace and security. Otherwise, the exception to the general
rule of the principle of nonintervention granted by Article 2(7) with regard
to measures taken under Chapter VII would be devoid of any substantive
meaning: acts of aggression and military threats to the peace by their very
nature are not internal matters of the member states. Measures taken against
such acts or threats, therefore, could never constitute an illegal intervention
under international law and would, therefore, not need to be expressly
excepted from the nonintervention principle of Article 2(7).46 Obviously,
Article 2(7) presupposes the possibility of measures by the Security Council
under Chapter VII that-if not taken under Chapter VII-would constitute
a violation of the nonintervention principle of Article 2(7). Actions by the
Security Council that would fall into this category would be authorizing
interventions into the territory of a member-state in order to end or prevent
genocide or the equivalent thereof. An example could have been a military
45. As an example one may point to the law of environmental protection on the high seas.
See D. K6NIG, DURCHSEmZUNG INTERNATIONALER BESTANDS-UND UMWELTSCHUTZVORSCHRIFTEN
AUF HOHER SEE IM INTRESSE DER STAATENoEMMNSCHAFT [ENF r oCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
NoRMs FOR THE PROTECTION OF LIVING RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT ON THE HIGH SEAs
IN THE INTEREST OF THE ComimuNITY OF NATIONS] (Ver6ffentlichungen des Instituts fUr Inter-
nationales Recht an der Universitit Kiel, Berlin, vol. 108. 1990).
46. This was observed by Heinz, Philipp & WoIfrum, supra note 4, at 126.
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intervention in Cambodia (Kampuchea) ordered by the Security Council to
end the genocidal massacres perpetrated by the Pol Pot regime.47
No such actions were taken by the Security Council, however. The reason
may be that the internal situation in Cambodia at the time was not
considered a direct threat to international peace and security. Even if the
Security Council had accepted the interpretation of Article 2(7) to the extent
that it permits forcible interventionist measures of the Security Council for
reasons other than fending off military acts of aggression or breaches of
or threats to the peace, the Council could not have reacted to the Pol Pot
massacres under Chapter VII without first deciding that the situation in
Cambodia constituted at least a threat to international peace and security.
Indeed, the analysis of a hypothetical UN intervention in Cambodia
makes it clear that interpreting Article 2(7) to allow Security Council
interventions for reasons other than combatting acts of aggression or similar
acts would not solve the problem. For if Article 2(7) permits interventions
for those other reasons, it does so only on the condition that these
interventions are measures taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, that is,
for the purpose of redressing a situation that is at least threatening to
"international peace and security ' 48 in the sense of Article 39 of the Charter.
This article is the sole legal basis for enforcement actions to be taken or
authorized by the Security Council. Article 2(7), as such, does not confer
additional powers on the Council; as stated before, it only grants exceptions
from the application of the nonintervention principle with regard to measures
taken under Chapter VII. These may cover forcible interventions aimed at
ending or preventing actions by individual states other than acts of aggres-
sion or threats to or breaches of the peace, but only if the actions constitute
at least a "threat to . .. international peace and security ' 49 under Article
39 of the Charter. If the Security Council is to react more effectively, that
is, possibly with the use of force, to grave violations of fundamental human
rights within the territory of an individual state, an additional step of
(re)interpretation of the Charter, specifically of Article 39, must be taken.
A suggested starting point here is to base the necessary (re)interpretation
on the notion of "threat to ... international peace and security" as used
in Article 39 of the Charter. 0 If the notion of a "threat to ... international
peace and security" is taken only to mean the threat of using military force
47. According to reliable reports, approximately one million people opposing the totalitarian
regime of the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot were killed until the regime was ultimately toppled
during a unilateral intervention by Vietnamese military forces. For a summary report and
analysis of the events in Cambodia, see Rapp, Konflikte, Kambodscha/Kampuchea, in HAND-
BUCH VE tnmN NAToNEN, supra note 12, at 449.
48. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
49. Id.
50. Article 39 speaks of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."
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in the international, transborder relations of states, situations such as the
genocide in Cambodia or the treatment of the Kurds in Iraq could not be
considered as a "threat to . . . international peace," thus excluding any
forcible intervention by the Security Council on behalf of the oppressed
people. If, however, Article 2(7) presupposes the possibility of enforcement
measures by the Security Council that may be directed against state actions
other than military threats to international peace and that would constitute
illegal acts of intervention were they not authorized or undertaken by the
Council under Chapter VII, this could be in conformity with the Charter
only if the notion of a "threat to ... international peace and security" as
used in Article 39 has a broader meaning than that of a military threat. It
must also comprise such situations that by their nature could potentially
become a threat to international peace in the narrower sense of Article 39.
As a matter of fact, the Security Council has for quite some time been
paving the way toward a broader understanding of the notion of "threat
to ... international peace and security." In the decisions taken under
Chapter VII against the apartheid regime in South Africa, the Council
characterized the apartheid system as a "threat to international peace." It
did so as well in its decisions on the Ian Smith Regime in Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe).5 In the recent decisions on Iraq, the Security Council has
also-as mentioned previously 2-characterized the persecution of the Kurds
as a "threat[] [to] international peace and security. ' 53 This view deserves
support.
54
It does not use the term "international" with regard to the term "peace" in the first part of
the provision. It does refer to "international" peace at the end of the article where it continues
that the Security Council shall determine "what measures shall be taken ... to maintain or
restore "international peace and security" (emphasis added). In the language used by the
Security Council in its resolutions it refers to "international peace and security." See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 688, supra note 5.
51. For a closer analysis of these decisions, see Delbriick, supra note 26, at 87.
52. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
53. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 5, at 859.
54. See Freedman, supra note 6, who essentially argues from the same perspective. He
correctly points out, however, that the United States was at first reluctant to intervene on
behalf of the Kurds, that is, to concern itself with the "internal affairs" of Iraq. Id. at 203
(citation omitted). This reluctance, Freedman explains, may become symptomatic of the
attitudes of many states in view of the increasing number of ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe.
Id. at 208. For in cases of ethnic strife of the kind experienced in Eastern Europe, the legal
situation may not be as clear cut as in the case of Iraq. Id. Freedman, therefore, voices some
skepticism as to whether the United Nations actions taken in the case of Iraq would be heeded
as a precedent in the future. Id. That the position taken in this Article, that is, that the United
Nations will play a more active role in cases of the kind dealt with here, is not wholly
unrealistic can be supported by the increased willingness on the part of the United Nations to
shoulder a greater responsibility in the international protection of human rights. For example,
the use of UN peace-keeping forces was recently authorized for El Salvador, see Central
America: Efforts Towards Peace: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.
U.N. Doc. S/22494 & Corr. 1 (1991), and the reconstruction of the internal order of Cambodia,
see Address by UN Secretary General Perez de Cu6llar before the Paris Peace Conference on
Cambodia, U.N. Weekly 7 (1991), No. 44, at 2.
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It is only realistic to assume that massive human rights violations of
genocidal dimensions will sooner or later escalate into international military
conflicts in a world highly sensitized by such events. The most recent
example of such a development is the war waged by the Yugoslavian-or
rather Serbian-central authority against Croatia, which has demanded the
free exercise of its right to national self-determination but is denied this by
Serbia's massive use of military force.5 What started as an internal conflict
has taken on the character of a threat to international peace. This means,
however, that in this case there is no need to operate with an extended
interpretation of the notion of "threat to ... international peace ' 56 since
by its own dynamics the conflict has become international in the sense of
Article 39 of the Charter. 7 It is also correct to state that massive and gross
violations of human rights of genocidal dimension, particularly if carried
out by military means, are incompatible with an understanding of peace as
a legal order and that they therefore constitute a threat to international
peace.
CONCLUSION
The preceding line of argument is based in part on international treaty
law under which interpretations of treaty provisions should enhance the
provisions' effectiveness." The argument is also in line with the developing
trends of the Law of the United Nations as indicated by the practice of the
main political organs, particularly of the Security Council. If followed with
55. It is correct, however, to point out that international law as of now does not, and
most likely will never, grant to minorities the right to secession as a consequence of exercising
the right to self-determination in each and every case. See, e.g., Partsch, supra note 4, at 473.
The principle of territorial integrity on the whole will take priority over the right to secession.
However, if a clearly defined national minority with a distinct and verifiable political will to
independence, a definable territory, and the ability to establish an effective national government
asserts independence, as in the case of Slovenia and Croatia, forcible suppression of the
exercise of the right to self-determination cannot be seen as justified on the basis of the
principle of territorial integrity. Partsch accepts this point of view in principle but doubts
whether these conditions are fulfilled in the case of Slovenia and Croatia. Id. at 474. This
author bases his argument on a different evaluation of the factual situation with regard to the
two states, which are now officially recognized by the member states of the European
Community.
56. See U.N. CHaTER art. 39.
57. By a resolution of September 25, 1991, the UN Security Council has drawn the
conclusions and has qualified the situation in Yugoslavia as a threat to international peace,
see U.N. CHARTER art. 39, and has decided under Chapter VII of the Charter on an arms
embargo against Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 713, 46 U.N. SCOR (3009th mtg.) (1991).
58. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires the parties to a
treaty to interpret its provisions good faith. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, effective Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. This implies the principle of
effectiveness or effet utile-rule, which shall guide the parties in the interpretation of a particular
treaty. See Heintschel von Heinegg, Die v61kerrechtlichen Vertriige als Hauptquellen des
V6lkerrechts, in V6LKERRECHT, supra note 10, at 125-26.
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persistence and determination, this line of reasoning could open up avenues
to more effective international protection of the most fundamental human
rights and, at the same time, more conflict prevention, thereby vitalizing
the UN role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Those
who are appalled by the idea that the United Nations could, even by using
military force under its command or authority, react both to military threats
to or breaches of international peace and to massive and gross violations
of fundamental human rights of a genocidal dimension must consider that
any such enforcement measures could only be resorted to as an ultima ratio.
Such enforcement measures could only be lawfully undertaken if enforce-
ment measures short of the use of military force have proven to be ineffective
and if the military enforcement measures are applied proportionately. 9
The more vigorous role for the United Nations proposed and discussed
here could also be played by regional institutions provided that adequate
powers are vested in such institutions. Opponents of such roles must realize
that to deny truly effective powers to the United Nations (or other insti-
tutions) in combatting massive and gross violations of human rights would
not eliminate the ethical dilemma inherent in any use of military force, or
the use of force by the police in cases of internal violence, for that matter.
Standing by idly in view of genocide or equivalent crimes against humanity
(or against the environment 6°) carries with it the charge of guilt.
59. The principle of proportionality is one of the basic substantive principles of general
international law that also governs the activities of the United Nations organs. See Partsch,
supra note 4, at 471 (emphasizing this point). For a concise explication of the meaning and
scope of the principle of proportionality, see Delbriick, Proportionality, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATiONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 396.
60. For a discussion of this aspect of a new role for the World Organization in a New
World Order, which has been very topical after the oil disaster brought about by President
Saddam Hussein of Iraq during the Gulf War, see Hendrikson, supra note 6, at 35.
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